EU sanctions: when is a payment indirectly prohibited?
A payment to a non-sanctioned party may still be prohibited under EU sanctions if sanctioned persons can actually obtain the funds. A mere claim to control or a theoretical possibility is not enough: the risk must be evidenced by objective data and be sufficiently probable.
The Court of Justice clarified this in its judgment of 15 October 2026 in Case C 842/24, DNO Yemen.
What is the case about?
The case centres on an arbitral award concerning oil and gas agreements in Yemen. The Yemeni Ministry of Oil and Minerals and the state-owned company YOGC had entered into oil and gas agreements with DNO, Petrolin, Moe and Dove. These companies withdrew in January 2015, after the Houthis had taken Sana’a. In ICC arbitration proceedings, DNO, Petrolin and Moe were subsequently ordered to pay compensation to the Ministry and YOGC.
An appeal was subsequently lodged, as the debtors argued that the payment could indirectly end up with individuals subject to EU sanctions against Yemen. The Cour d’Appel in France ruled that no control by the Houthis over the Ministry or YOGC had been demonstrated and that the payment must therefore be made.
The judgment was subsequently declared enforceable in Norway. On 4 December 2023, DNO paid the net amount exclusively to the Ministry, after YOGC had transferred its rights to the Ministry. On appeal, DNO and Petrolin argue that the Court of Appeal wrongly made control a condition. In their view, the Court should have examined whether the funds could benefit the listed persons, even in the absence of control.
The questions referred for a preliminary ruling, posed by the French Court of Cassation, boil down to the following:
- Can payment to an unsanctioned public entity constitute indirect provision to a sanctioned entity?
- Does a presumption of control arise where there are competing claims to control?
- Is a reasonable risk that the funds will benefit sanctioned persons sufficient?
Can a payment to an unlisted public entity constitute an indirect provision of funds?
Yes, provided that the listed persons can actually obtain the funds. Also, the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may fall within this scope.
Broad interpretation
The prohibition and the concept of ‘made available’ are interpreted broadly. This covers all acts through which the listed person actually gains the power of disposal, without the need for any specific legal classification (Möllendorf, Afrasiabi). The aim is to prevent circumvention of the freeze (Bank Sepah, EM System).
Criteria as indicators
The Afrasiabi criteria (acting in the name of, under the control of or on the instructions of, with the intention of using the funds for the benefit of the listed person) and the SH criteria (the assets may be transferred, or there is power of disposal via legal or financial links) are merely relevant circumstances. If they are absent, indirect provision of funds is not thereby ruled out.
Application
The Houthis have established parallel administrative structures, claim control over the ministry and the YOGC, use the YOGC’s website, appear to be able to issue instructions to oil companies and have also addressed requests to DNO. Persons authorised by them could therefore present themselves as entitled to the assets. Whether this is in fact possible is a matter for the national court to assess.
Does a presumption of control arise where there are rival claims to control?
No. The mere fact that sanctioned persons and the legitimate government both claim control over a state-owned entity does not mean that the sanctioned persons are deemed to control that entity. The court must assess the risk on the basis of sufficiently concrete, precise and mutually consistent evidence.
The fact that the legitimate government does not cooperate with the sanctioned persons is relevant, but does not automatically rule out the risk. The court must also consider concrete measures taken by the government and the entity concerned that could effectively prevent the sanctioned persons or their authorised representatives from receiving the payment.
When is the risk significant enough?
A purely hypothetical risk is not sufficient. Political uncertainty or speculation about possible influence cannot, in itself, justify a payment ban. The risk must be substantiated by objective, material evidence regarding the means available to sanctioned persons to obtain the funds. Furthermore, the likelihood of the risk materialising must be sufficiently high to justify the prohibition. All circumstances must be taken into account, including measures that may prevent the funds from being obtained.
This limitation is important because an overly broad application could also affect the legitimate beneficiary. The Court warns that a payment ban based solely on the Houthi movement’s claim to control may be disproportionate and may even undermine the objectives of the sanctions regime.
Who must prove the risk?
The party seeking the setting aside of an arbitral award on the grounds that payment is contrary to the sanctions regime must substantiate its claim. It must provide sufficiently concrete, precise and coherent evidence from which it appears, at first glance, that there is a non-negligible risk that the funds will benefit sanctioned persons. Only once this requirement has been met must the beneficiaries provide information sufficient to legally rule out the risk. They cannot be required to provide negative proof that there is absolutely no risk of funds being made available indirectly.
If the case file gives rise to serious doubts, the national court may, within the applicable procedural rules, request further information and documents, whilst ensuring that both sides are heard.
What does this mean for payments to non-sanctioned parties?
The judgment makes it clear that a payment to an unsanctioned party does not automatically fall outside the scope of the sanctions regime. The assessment framework has been broadened in this respect. Control or acting on behalf of another is no longer the only route to indirect provision of funds. The key issue is whether the listed person can actually obtain the funds. This is particularly important for payments to entities in areas with rival authority structures, and not only in Yemen. The specific payment route, the actual possibility of obtaining the funds and the effectiveness of protective measures are decisive.
At the same time, over-compliance is also curtailed. The preventive nature of sanctions does not justify a block on the basis of a hypothetical risk. Judges must work on the basis of objective data and a sufficiently high degree of probability.
With regard to the burden of proof, the Court takes a leap by applying a kind of presumption of proof. This may be significant in annulment and exequatur proceedings, where a conflict with public policy arising from sanctions is invoked.